










    





  A different Capitalism? Guanxi-Capitalism  
  and the Importance of Family in Modern China 



























Frankfurt Working Papers on East Asia 
IZO | Interdisciplinary Centre for East Asian Studies  
Goethe University Frankfurt am Main 
www.izo.uni-frankfurt.de 23 
 




IZO Interdisziplinäres Zentrum für Ostasienstudien 
Interdisciplinary Centre for East Asian Studies 
Goethe University Frankfurt am Main 
 
ISSN number (Print)    ISSN 1869-6872 
ISSN number (Online)  ISSN 2190-7080  
The Frankfurt Working Papers on East Asia are intended to disseminate the research 
results of work in progress prior to publication and to encourage academic debate and 
suggestions for revisions. The contents of the papers reflect the views of the authors 
who are solely responsible for the facts and the accuracy of the information presented 
herein. The Interdisciplinary Centre for East Asian Studies assumes no liability for the 
contents or any use thereof. All Frankfurt Working Papers on East Asia are available 
online and free of charge at http://www.izo.uni-frankfurt.de/Frankfurt_Working_ 
Papers_on_East_Asia/index.html. Printed versions are available on request. 
 
Executive editor of the series: Thomas Feldhoff 




IZO Interdisziplinäres Zentrum für Ostasienstudien 
Interdisciplinary Centre for East Asian Studies 
Goethe University Frankfurt am Main 
Senckenberganlage 31 
D-60325 Frankfurt am Main 
T: +49(0)69 798 23284 
F: +49(0)69 798 23275 
E: izo@uni-frankfurt.de 
H: www.izo.uni-frankfurt.de 45 
 
Frankfurt Working Papers on East Asia 3/2011 
 
 
A different Capitalism? Guanxi-Capitalism and the Importance of 




The emergence of Capitalism is said to always lead to extreme changes in the structure 
of a society. This view implies that Capitalism is a universal and unique concept that 
needs an explicit institutional framework and should not discriminate between a 
German or US Capitalism. In contrast, this work argues that the ‘ideal type’ of 
Capitalism in a Weberian sense does not exist. It will be demonstrated that Capitalism 
is not a concept that shapes a uniform institutional framework within every society, 
constructing a specific economic system. Rather, depending on the institutional 
environment - family structures in particular - different forms of Capitalism arise. To 
exemplify this, the networking (Guanxi) Capitalism of contemporary China will be 
presented, where social institutions known from the past were reinforced for successful 
development. It will be argued that especially the change, destruction and creation of 
family and kinship structures are key factors that determined the further development 
and success of the Chinese economy and the type of Capitalism arising there. In 
contrast to Weber, it will be argued that Capitalism not necessarily leads to a process of 
destruction of traditional structures and to large-scale enterprises under rational, 
bureaucratic management, without leaving space for socio-cultural structures like 
family businesses. The flexible global production increasingly favours small business 
production over larger corporations. Small Chinese family firms are able to respond to 
rapidly changing market conditions and motivate maximum efforts for modest pay. The 
structure of the Chinese family proved to be very persistent over time and to be able to 
accommodate diverse economic and political environments while maintaining its core 
identity. This implies that Chinese Capitalism may be an entirely new economic 
system, based on Guanxi and the family.  
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“The history of a thing, in general, is the succession of forces which take 
possession of it and the co-existence of the forces which struggle for 
possession. The same object, the same phenomenon, changes sense 
depending on the force which appropriates it.”1 
 
Since China opened up to the global market in 1978, it formed an economic system that 
presents a specific type of Capitalism, embedded in the socio-cultural environment of 
post-1978 China. It successfully thrives within a different framework of institutions 
than - what in this paper will be called - Western-type Capitalism, especially relying on 
the family and personal connections to facilitate business, comprising a way of doing 
business ‘Chinese style’. It is often doubted that this version of Capitalism will be 
sustainable and many believe that over time it will transform into a system that 
converges to the usual contractual market institutions found in the West. Although 
China is considered as increasingly important for the shape of the global economy, it is 
argued that it still needs to follow the basic rules of a market economy.2 Once the 
economy develops into a mature capitalistic society with its own functioning set of 
legal institutions and secured property rights, the necessity of maintaining Guanxi 
(network) connections for economic success will come to an end. This line of argument 
also perceives Guanxi as less efficient and more time and money consuming than the 
Western contractual institutions.  
          In Western view, Capitalism is inevitably leading to a system with large-scale 
enterprises under efficient rational management which increasingly will be independent 
of personal relations. Those arguments can already be found in the writing of Max 
Weber who associates Capitalism with the destruction of traditional structures, leading 
to large-scale enterprises and rising bureaucratisation and rationalisation. For him, it is 
the nature - or spirit - of modern Capitalism to impose a unique institutional structure 
on the existing traditional society to develop. The institutionalised instrumental 
rationality does not leave space for outdated socio-cultural structures like family 
businesses. Thus, Capitalism eliminates obsolescent cultural idiosyncrasies, which have 
been specifically developed for a feudal economy and were only able to function in the 
                                                 
1 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix (1994 [1983]): Anti-Oedipus. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota 
Press, p. 3, found in Yang, Mayfair Mei-hui (1994): Gifts, Favors and Banquets. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. 
Press, p. 173.  
2 For example Taube, Markus (2007): China ante portas – Die neue Ordnung der Weltwirtschaft. 
Universität Duisburg-Essen. Presentation in Frankfurt Main, November, 14 2007. 8 
 
framework of this social environment, affecting family structures in particular. The 
traditional rural self-sufficient household that could be found in similar form in most 
Western European countries integrated personal and business sphere but in the 
capitalistic economy, the rationality of companies contrasts the “sentimentality of the 
family”. In the course of the evolution of Capitalism, the family as economic unit 
vanished and retreated to the privacy of their homes.3 Human beings became “fictitious 
commodities”4, traded on (labour) markets, thus obliterating the old 'oikos'. Even more 
than that, Capitalism not only forms a uniform institutional framework, overriding 
traditional structures; it also separates private and business spheres not only in a spatial 
sense but also creates a separate form of behavior with its own set of rules and morality 
for doing business. 
     Therefore, the emergence of Capitalism during the 18
th century in Europe, in the 
wake of the Industrial Revolution, lead to extreme changes in the structure of Western 
societies. It introduced a new institutional mechanism to a hitherto feudal society based 
on autarkic households, replacing these structures with capitalistic production based on 
factory work that is dependent on wage labour to be prosperous. Industrialization 
therefore fuelled its own motor of development and propelled the Western European 
societies from feudalism to Capitalism. With this, a market economy arose where 
instead of an economic life embedded into society, social institutions served as mere 
accessories to the economic system. The economy became autonomous, dominated by 
a rational spirit based on efficiency and profitability and at least similar institutions no 
matter where it arose. In this environment, the family lost its influence, not only over 
its members, but also on how one’s living was earned.  
     Following the conception of Weber, a unique type of a universal Capitalism would 
imply an explicit institutional framework that evens out the differences between 
countries and different forms of Capitalism. Hence, it should not discriminate between 
a German, Swedish or US Capitalism, even if a more sophisticated social security 
system can be found in one country or the importance of individualism is stressed in 
another.5 In recent times, especially due to growing global involvement, it can be easily 
argued that the Chinese success is not a sustainable structure but merely temporary. 
                                                 
3 Brunner, Otto (1956), ibid., p. 42. 
4 Polanyi, Karl (1944): The Great Transformation. New York: Farrar & Rinehart., p. 68ff. 
5 Fulcher, James (2004): Capitalism. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, p. 121f. and 178. 9 
 
Like in 19
th century Europe, social structures might be tenacious, but in the end will 
wither away. 
     However,  globalization  may  also  change this hitherto unquestioned “accepted 
wisdom”, as the increasingly flexible global production favours subcontracting and 
small-scale production over larger corporations. Consequently, this work argues that 
institutional forms can be varied and combined differently, thus an ‘ideal type’ of 
Capitalism in a Weberian sense does not exist.6 It will be demonstrated that Capitalism 
is not a concept that shapes a uniform institutional framework within every society, 
constructing a specific economic system. In contrast, this paper argues that it is possible 
to achieve economic success with a variety of Capitalism based on a different set of 
institutions. Depending on the institutional environment - family structures in particular 
- different forms of Capitalism arise. There is not one ‘best practice’ for a country to 
follow the dynamics and regulations of a capitalistic economy, but depending on the 
specifics of the institutional background of a country, there are diverse ways to 
efficiently implement Capitalism.7  
     To exemplify this, the networking (Guanxi) Capitalism of contemporary China will 
be presented, where social institutions known from the past were reinforced for 
successful development. It will be argued that personal connections based on the family 
structures prevail and that the small-scale production of family firms has a comparative 
advantage in the globalized world of today. These key factors determine the further 
development and success of the Chinese economy and the type of Capitalism arising 
there. Small Chinese family firms connected over Guanxi networks are able to respond 
to rapidly changing demand and motivate maximum efforts for modest pay. The 
structure of the Chinese family proved to be very persistent over time and to be able to 
accommodate diverse economic and political environments while maintaining its core 
identity. It was able to react extremely flexible to the changed market conditions after 
1978 and used the opportunity for private business initiative. This paper argues that in 
modern China a different type of Capitalism emerged, embedded in a different 
institutional framework. It forms a new economic system, based on different principles 
such as Guanxi and the family, with business and personal area not separated into 
different spheres. Moreover, it is a system that is more sustainable than is often 
assumed as those features are immanent to Chinese culture and will not become extinct. 
                                                 
6 Screpanti, Ernesto (2001): The fundamental institutions of capitalism. London: Routledge, p. 266f. 
7 Amable, Bruno (2003): The diversity of modern capitalism. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, p. 9. 10 
 
Therefore, this work is organized as follows: after a critical discussion of Weber’s 
notion of Capitalism, I will turn to Chinese Capitalism, the so-called Guanxi-type 
Capitalism. Related to this, a discussion on the gestalt of Chinese Capitalism will be 
provided, with an emphasis on the significance of family structures for economic 
development. The last chapter concludes. 
 
 
2. One Capitalism? A different Varieties of Capitalism Approach 
 
“No mistake about it, the travail was over and the market system had been 
born. The problem of survival was henceforth to be solved neither by 
custom nor by command, but by the free action of profit-seeking men bound 
together only by the market itself. The system was to be called Capitalism. 
And the idea of gain which underlay it was so firmly rooted that men would 
soon vigorously affirm that it was an eternal and omnipresent attitude”.8 
 
The term Capitalism is not easy to define and it never was since its creation in the 19
th 
century, mostly used without set agreement on its precise meaning, which varies 
enormously in the interpretations of different authors.9 Many definitions exist, based on 
different concepts and typologies, but it was never really free of value judgement and 
political connotation. As a result Capitalism is "less a means of insight than a means for 
accusal".10 In its English usage it is considerably less encumbered and less political 
than in Germany, where the term Capitalism was a popular ideological instrument, 
especially at the beginning of the 20
th century.11 
          Often, especially in more recent definitions, it is associated with an economic 
system where capital is central for all economic transactions and activities, together 
with a liberal economic order with free workers and freedom of property. Capitalistic 
economic orders are often seen as the “eternal shape of an economy”, a “realization of 
economic rationality” and “the means for the end of satisfaction of needs”; others see 
                                                 
8 Heilbroner, Robert L. (1953): The wordly philosophers. New York: Simon and Schuster, p. 24. 
9 The term 'Capitalism’ is of French origin, and is used in Germany from the 1870s in critical 
descriptions of the negative development of society. In: Brunner, Otto; Conze, Werner and Koselleck, 
Reinhart (1982): "H - Me," in: Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen 
Sprache in Deutschland, Otto Brunner; Werner Conze; Reinhart Koselleck (ed.), Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 
Art. on ‘Capital, Capitalist and Capitalism’). 
10 Pohle, L. (1910): "Der Unternehmerstand," in: Vorträge der Gehe-Stiftung zu Dresden, Leipzig: 
Teubner, p. 6, my own translation. 
11 Jaeger, Friedrich (2007): Jenseits - Konvikt. Stuttgart: Metzler, Art. on Capitalism by Werner Plumpe, 
p. 363. 11 
 
Capitalism merely as a special case of a rational economy.12 On the other hand, the 
term Capitalism can include social relations as part of the economic system, it is thus 
non-technological.13 
          In this paper, I will not try to find an unambiguous, ultimate definition of 
Capitalism, but rather present the view of one specific author, Max Weber, whom I see 
to have the most valuable and useful definition for this purpose. His view creates an 
ideal type of Capitalism assuming a certain attitude towards the economy that includes 
increasing rationalization, bureaucratization and professionalization within a 
homogenous institutional framework, based on a certain spirit. In this setting, personal 
connections play a decreasing role in doing business, and are replaced by contractual 
relations. This point of view is still a common argument within standard economics 
literature.  
     In  addition,  Capitalism  in  Weber's analysis overrides traditional socio-cultural 
institutions to create a system of large-scale enterprises under rational, bureaucratic 
management, making the family as economic unit obsolete. This phenomenon is 
considered to be independent of individual institutional frameworks. Local economies 
are regarded to be always standardized after the doctrine of “individual maximization, 
rational-legal principles and private accumulation. […] Older forms are seen to present 
no challenge to the all-encompassing and overriding logic of Capitalism, whose 
development is predetermined”.14 
 
 
2.1. Theoretical Foundation 
 
Weber's ideal type conception of a Capitalism that forms homogenous institutions no 
matter where it arises (see below) is at least in similar arguments often brought to the 
front even today. In contrast, in recent years a vast amount of literature and much 
discussion has been spurred by a research area called the Variety of Capitalism 
approach. Its theories and models are based on new institutional economics, 
underscoring the effect of distinct institutional arrangements for economic 
                                                 
12 Heimann, Eduard (1931): Kapitalismus und Sozialismus. Potsdam: Protte, p. 33+42, my own 
translation. 
13 Appel, Michael (1992): Werner Sombart. Marburg, Metropolis Verl, p. 77. 
14 Yang, Mayfair Mei-Hui (2000): "Putting Global Capitalism in Its Place: Economic Hybridity, Bataille, 
and Ritual Expenditure," Current Anthropology, 41, 477-509, p. 481. 12 
 
performance, thereby painting a static picture of Capitalism, relying "on rather ad hoc 
descriptions of actual institutions and institutional forms", looking for equilibrium 
outcomes.15 As David Lane puts it: "The Varieties of Capitalism approach does not 
capture the dynamics of the economic systems in the countries undergoing 
transformation".16 Not least, because those models take a democratic polity as given 
and "fail to account for the political dynamics of post-socialist economies".17 Still, 
diverse structures are defined to be efficient types of Capitalism. Efficiency in this 
framework is understood "in terms of strategic complementarities among 
organizational elements",18 but as one other insight of the institutional school 
underscores, "what survives organizationally may not be most efficient or effective, but 
it survives anyway because it has come to be instilled with value in that specific 
institutional context”.19 Hence, the view that institutions are designed and adopted for 
efficiency reasons is challenged, rather "institutions are the expression of a political 
compromise".20  
     Consequently, research in the Varieties of Capitalism line is primarily focused on 
Western Europe and North America and thus "post-industrial economies". Although it 
does not suggest that countries over time will converge to a single model of best 
practise and argues that due to path dependency different sets of institutions lead to 
different forms of Capitalism, in my opinion due to the way those conclusions are 
reached it cannot be adequately used to describe the Chinese emerging economic 
system.  
     For example, in his book on the diversity of modern Capitalism Amable defines five 
types of Capitalism, thereby largely ignoring socio-cultural institutions: “Plain 
regularities of behaviour are not institutions […]. An institution must be a rule which 
applies to all the cases”.21 His approach is much broader than that of Hall and Soskice 
                                                 
15 Gregory Jackson; Richard Deeg (2006): How many varieties of capitalism? Comparing the 
comparative institutional analyses of capitalist diversity. Köln: MPIfG, p. 22ff. 
16 Lane, David Stuart (2005): "Emerging varities of capitalism in former state socialist societies," 
Competition & change, 9, 227-247, p. 228. 
17 Wilson, Jeanne Lorraine (2007): "China's Economic Transformation towards Capitalism," in: 
Varieties of capitalism in post-communist countries, Lane, David (ed.), Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, p. 253. 
18 Gregory Jackson; Richard Deeg (2006): ibid., p. 5. 
19 Kiong, Tong Chee and Kee, Yong Pit (1998): "Guanxi Bases, Xinyong and Chinese Business 
Networks," The British Journal of Sociology, 49, 75-96, p. 87. 
20 Amable, Bruno (2003): ibid., p. 9. 
21 Amable, Bruno (2003): ibid., p. 37 13 
 
whose dichotomous framework mainly concentrates on the firm as unit of inquiry.22 
The building blocks of their analysis focus on "micro-agents such as firms, employees 
or shareholders, and how they organize production…describing the affinities between 
different institutions and the product market strategies of business firms".23 The five 
areas that for Amable differentiate Capitalisms are the product-market competition, the 
wage-labour nexus and labour market institutions, the financial-intermediation sector 
and corporate governance, social protection and the education sector.24 
     For Amable, the pressure of globalization and worldwide liberalization, particularly 
of financial services, has evened out differences between the EU and the rest of the 
world. Even though, Capitalism is a robust environment that principally can 
accommodate varied institutional environments.25 Thus, the Asian model of Capitalism 
he introduces hinges on the collaboration of large corporations with the government. 
He claims that “workers' specific investments are protected by a de facto protection of 
employment and possibilities of retraining and career-making within the corporation. 
Lack of social protection and sophisticated financial markets make risk diversification 
difficult and render the stability provided by the large corporation crucial to the 
existence of the model”.26 Hence, it focuses on the state and collective sector, totally 
neglecting the private sector, mainly based on family businesses, which on the other 
hand this paper argues to be the driving force of development. In other words, Amable's 
model ignores the importance of socio-cultural institutions, family structures in 
particular, for the formation of a capitalistic system what this work regards as essential 
for the type of Capitalism developing in China. It is important to note that “Capitalism 
is a much larger and more complex entity than the market system we use as its 
equivalent…The market system is the principal means of binding and coordinating the 
whole, but markets are not the source of capitalism’s energies nor of its distinctive 
bifurcation of authority”.
27 
     For those reasons, this work, instead of constructing “Capitalism as a monolithic, 
all-encompassing, penetrating, seamless, and integrated total system with a 
                                                 
22 Hall, Peter A. and Soskice, David (2004): Varieties of capitalism. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. 
23 Gregory Jackson; Richard Deeg (2006): ibid., p. 21+34. 
24 Amable, Bruno (2003): ibid., p. 93. 
25 Amable, Bruno (2003): ibid., p. 3f. 
26 Amable, Bruno (2003): ibid., p. 107. 
27 Heilbroner, Robert L. (1993): 21st century capitalism. New York, NY: Norton, p. 96. 14 
 
predetermined and knowable teleology”28 in line with Weber’s thinking, a different 
type of Capitalism will be identified that consists of its own characteristic institutions. 
In contrast to the reasoning found in the majority of the Varieties-literature my 
arguments are based on (American) Institutionalism29 – as opposed to New Institutional 
Economics – with its holistic approach that enables me to describe different types of 
Capitalism. Contrary to the methodological approach of standard economics which 
bases its analysis on the individual, Institutionalism follows behaviourism because it is 
rooted in institutional structures for the explanation of human behaviour. Hence, an 
individual is more than just the “missing middle term in stimulus-response 
psychology”.30 It supports the view that different sets of institutions can lead to 
different forms of Capitalism, depending on the cultural and institutional environment. 
It is a tool to provide critical insight into the dynamics of social change and to explain 
human behaviour within its institutional and cultural context in a narrative way.  
     Institutionalism  employs  pattern  models to explain human behaviour within its 
institutional and cultural context in a narrative way. Those models are based on case 
studies of special or historical environments each coming with their own set of 
institutions. For example, to create a theory of Chinese Capitalism, an institutionalist 
looks at the cultural setting surrounding the individual to construct a pattern of 
economic behaviour. Ideally, the model is then followed by an empirical test that 
compares the interpretations with data from case studies and other data sources to see if 
the structure of the model coincides with that of the concrete reality of the world. For 
institutionalists, modelling is a continuous process which never ends, because there are 
always new case studies or changes in institutions and so the theory has to be 
constantly updated and evaluated against the new data. This means the model is 
constantly revised and filled with new details and is therefore never completed. Hence, 
the aim of Institutionalism is not to be especially rigorous, or to be applicable on a 
general level, with forming a law-like statement, but to be able to understand and 
explain rather than predict a specific situation. Due to its characteristics, 
Institutionalism determines a “spectrum of acceptable alternatives from which 
                                                 
28 Yang, Mayfair Mei-Hui (2000): ibid., p. 483. 
29 Economic sociology provides similar framework, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore 
the (dis-) similarities to new and old institutional economics. See for example Smelser, Neil J. and 
Swedberg, Richard (1994): The handbook of economic sociology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. 
30 Dugger, William M. (1979): "Methodological Differences between Institutional and Neoclassical 
Economics," Journal of Economic Issues, XIII, 899 – 909, p. 904. 15 
 
individuals can choose”.31 As individuals are situated in a specific cultural 
environment, their preference functions are not perceived as given, but are subject to 
constant change and adaption. Institutionalists claim that individuals are only part of a 
greater whole, and this whole is more then the sum of its parts. Institutions are defined 
as a going concern “which engages in a series of transactions within the guidelines of a 
set of working rules”.32 Individuals are at the same time part and product of those going 
concerns.  
          Although providing no general model, the process of comparison can reveal a 
typology. A type is defined as an abstract description of situations or phenomena, 
which indicates the characteristics of particular importance to a system. A type 
summarizes the analysed cases and in this respect gains reality in the sense that it 
describes the concrete reality of the system. Therefore, not the type itself, but the cases 
are real. Typologies reduce too complex features and deliver some level of abstraction. 
          Thus, I am going to construct a (partial) typology of Capitalism, following the 
principle of Institutionalism. I do not try to provide a complete typology of Capitalism 
but will establish the existence of a distinct Chinese form of Capitalism by describing 
its institutional idiosyncrasies. 
          Of course, all types of Capitalism share some prominent features, such as the 
accumulation of money and wealth as a common objective of capitalistic actions. In 
McNally, Christopher (2006) the "three basic elements of capitalism" are named with 
"the drive to amass capital; the emergence of market society; and the bifurcation of 
secular authority".33 The third element means that "an autonomous, self-directing 
economic realm appears that assures the continued existence and social influence of 
capital-holders".34 
     Thus, this work will talk of a Western Capitalism, meaning the Capitalism already 
described by Weber (see below) and on the other hand still being in place in basically 
all industrialized Western countries. As opposed to that I define a Chinese form of 
Capitalism that is embedded into a different institutional framework based on different 
principles such as Guanxi and the family and therefore requires a different set of 
institutions than the Western type.  
                                                 
31 Dugger, William M. (1979): ibid., p. 905. 
32 Dugger, William M. (1979): ibid., p. 901. 
33 McNally, Christopher (2006): Insinuations on China’s Emergent Capitalism. East-West Center 
Working Papers, p. 2. 
34 McNally, Christopher (2006): ibid., p. 5. 16 
 
     As a result, although it is not based on the Varieties of Capitalism approach, I am 
still arguing that Capitalism is not a concept that necessarily shapes a uniform 
institutional framework within every society, constructing a specific economic system. 
Although shared characteristics exist, there can be an alternate embodiment of 
Capitalism in different regions with diverse cultures and history, and thus a specific 
Chinese Capitalism depending on a particular institutional framework exists. 
 
 
2.2. Max Weber and the Protestant Ethic of Capitalism35 
 
Capitalism for Max Weber is defined as a function of a certain spirit, described by a 
systematic combination of characteristics, creating the modern, rational Capitalism. 
This type of Capitalism not only needs a certain attitude, but is also considered as an 
age of separation, by which not merely separating the pre-modern traditional economy 
from the modern, capitalistic one is meant, but also the separations taking place in 
people’s private lives. To do this, it needs to destroy and supplant the traditional socio-
cultural structures of society to prosper. 
     In 19
th century Germany, family structures were still built so as to fit in the feudal 
structures of medieval Europe. The traditional household was not able to counter 
Capitalism and  the traditional institutions withered away. The unity of house and 
business was lost, which for Weber was a mandatory prerequisite for successful 
capitalistic production. Individuals had to be turned into ‘fictitious commodities’ who 
found themselves in an unescapable ‘iron cage’. After migrating to the cities, the 
significance of the household in providing shelter and guidance vanished. In the 
traditional economy, the pater familias had sole responsibility for business, organizing 
the work within the household.36 With the emergence of Capitalism, the head of the 
household lost his main function, to protect and to organize the work within the family 
household. He also lost his power over family members who were not bound to the 
strict hierarchy anymore.37 
     The traditional family division of labour was put under pressure because production 
and retail sale were disconnected in time and space by the intervention of an 
                                                 
35 See Weber, Max (1976 [1930]): ibid. 
36 Dülmen, Richard van (1995): Kultur und Alltag in der Frühen Neuzeit. München: Beck, p. 41 and 
Weber - Kellermann, Ingeborg (1988): Landleben im 19. Jahrhundert. München: Beck, p. 144. 
37 Egner, Erich (1985): Der Verlust der alten Ökonomik. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, p. 140f. 17 
 
entrepreneur who advanced money for production with the object of subsequent sale at 
a profit. Individuals were transformed into a class of propertyless workers that was 
forced to sell its labour power.38 Workers were “crowded together in new places of 
desolation […]; the family was on the road to perdition; and large parts of the country 
were rapidly disappearing under the slack and scrap heaps vomited forth from the 
‘satanic mills’”.39 This vigorous description of the living conditions of England’s 
workers is similarly vivid in Weber’s image of the “iron cage”40, describing the forces 
behind Capitalism and its effect on cultural and social institutions as “a veritable abyss 
of human degradation”.41 
     Thus, Max Weber defines Capitalism as “present wherever the industrial provision 
for the needs of a human group is carried out by the method of enterprise” and “a 
rational capitalistic establishment” as “one with capital accounting”. The spirit of 
Capitalism for him describes “the attitude which seeks profit rationally and 
systematically”42 and which changes the lifestyle of people fundamentally. He 
describes it as a separation of formerly unified units and institutions. Capitalism had 
constituted a completely new epoch, breaking with the old economic order and 
challenging the existing institutions. It developed a dynamic which became impossible 
to stop once it started; competition was the fuel that kept this ‘machine’ going.  
          Although in former economies greed and “the universal reign of absolute 
unscrupulousness in the pursuit of selfish interests by the making of money” existed, 
they were driven by an “uncontrolled impulse” of “ruthless acquisition” which lacked 
the discipline and rationality of bourgeois Capitalism.43 This separates the modern 
human from the traditional which – at least in the philosophical thinking of the time - 
did not strive to earn more and more money but were content in the Aristotelian sense 
to lead a ‘good life’. Capitalism gave people the means to overcome traditionalism. 
     In  The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism Max Weber analyses the 
relationship between religion and the economy and its relevance for the emergence of 
                                                 
38 Wehler, Hans-Ulrich (1989): Vom Feudalismus des Alten Reiches bis zur Defensiven Modernisierung 
der Reformära and  Von der Reformära bis zur industriellen und politischen ''Deutschen 
Doppelrevolution''. Frankfurt am Main: Büchergilde Gutenberg, p. 141+592 and Polanyi, Karl (1944): 
ibid., p. 3, 16f.+55. 
39 Polanyi, Karl (1944), ibid., p. 39. 
40 Weber, Max (1976 [1930]): The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: Allen & 
Unwin, p. 181. 
41 Polanyi, Karl (1944): ibid., p. 39. 
42 Weber, Max (1976 [1930]): ibid., p. 64. 
43 Weber, Max (1976 [1930]): ibid., p. 54-67. 18 
 
Capitalism. The modern rational capitalistic spirit relies on the religious assurance of 
salvation of Calvinism, dependent on “the rational capitalistic organization of 
(formally) free labour”.44 Not only is free labour a major characteristic of rational 
bourgeois Capitalism, but a “rational industrial organization, attuned to a regular 
market, and neither to political or irrationally speculative opportunities for profit” is 
also necessary. Essential for this type of economic system is thus freedom of markets 
with a regulated exchange and rational forms of organisations like corporations that use 
book-keeping for their business calculations with the aim of profit maximization. 
Weber defines rationalization as a unique view of the world achieved by the Western 
civilization. He associates it with the “belief that sense, perception and reasoning 
(rather than faith) are the sole or ultimate source of knowledge”.45  
          Therefore, also institutional preconditions also play an important role for the 
Weberian type of Capitalism, especially the spatial separation of business from the 
household, therefore also the separation of corporate from personal property.46 But not 
only physical institutions are separated, destructing formerly holistic  units into 
fractions; Capitalism also separates people from their homes. The “iron cage”47 of 
modern Capitalism makes people feel that through the forced artificial conditions of 
separation of private sphere and working life also their body and soul are separated.48 
Not pride or pleasure in the quality one is able to produce motivated to work hard but 
piece-work wages and the fear of dismissal. Capitalism has “through the subordination 
of the process of production to scientific point of view, relieved it from its dependence 
upon the natural organic limitations of the human individual”.49  
     For Weber a certain spirit is the prerequisite, not the result of Capitalism and is 
manifested in an economic ethos for both entrepreneur and employer. This results in a 
causal relation between the “Spirit of Capitalism” and the protestant ethic. Calvinism 
represents an asceticism that shows close affinity to the spirit of Capitalism. It rests on 
predetermination which commits the believer to an active, ascetic, this-worldly life 
with work being a sign of true faith that oneself is among God’s chosen. A state of 
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mind has been developed that fits perfectly to the functional characteristics of the 
capitalistic economy.50 “Labour must […] be performed as if it were an absolute end in 
itself, a calling”.51 This also cultivated an impersonal attitude toward the duties of an 
office and fostered the individualism necessary to rationally organize labour in a 
competitive world. Other humans only endanger the election by God, therefore 
individuals need to separate themselves to ensure their own election.52 “The sole 
purpose of his life-work, to sink into the grave weighted down with a great material 
load of money and goods”53 can only be understood from the viewpoint of the 
development of a capitalistic economy. 
     In Capitalism, money acquisition is treated as an end, rather than a means and is not 
seen as evil any more, although the Puritan entrepreneur is still careful of the “ethical 
limitations” given by religion. As Weber says “the Puritans wanted to work in a calling; 
we are forced to do so”, finding ourselves inside the “iron cage”.54 Weber's system of 
modern Capitalism is constituted in a process of rationalization, which needed to 
overcome the traditional family-based institutions to create an economic order that 
could be based on propertyless wage labour and thus, be successful. 
 
 
3. Chinese Capitalism and the Role of the Family  
 
3.1. Guanxi and its Role for the Chinese Economic System55 
 
While 19
th century-type Capitalism required that the old institutions be destroyed and 
exchanged for ones with adapted structures also for families, it is quite different for 
China. After 1978, the Guanxi-type Capitalism revived traditional institutions, which 
especially in rural areas was vital for its success. In contrast to many East European 
countries, the transformation since 1978 from command to market economy, and thus 
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to Capitalism, was achieved very smoothly and with a success which is largely 
unequalled in history. The economic rise of the Asian region, most recently of China, 
coincided with an increasingly flexible global production and thus the transformation to 
a capitalistic economy increased its pace since the 1990s.56 This is partly due to the 
(re)construction of a private sector and entrepreneurship parallel to the state sector. The 
Chinese population was able to resort to socio-cultural institutions, such as personal 
networks, from their own history, which were not forgotten during the time of 
communism. The family was the most prominent device for establishing small 
businesses and networks.  
     The Chinese expression for personal networks is Guanxi (). Guanxi describes 
the dynamics of constructing personal relationships within networks and is a central 
feature of today’s Chinese society. Personal connections between individuals consist in 
granting favours, receiving services or in gift-giving. The social status of people 
interacting in Guanxi needs not be equal, more important is the existence of Gnqíng 
(i.e. ‘feeling’) even in hierarchical relations. Guanxi is built on pre-existing links to 
people with whom a shared identity exist, like those from the same regional origin, 
classmates, teachers, superiors or co-workers, but most importantly with the family.57 
Therefore, Guanxi is a process of inventing and re-inventing relationships as ongoing 
“social engineering”.58 Guanxi is embedded in most functions of everyday life, 
including agricultural production, political alliances, and recreational or economic 
activities.59  
     Concepts related to Guanxi are Gnqíng () and Rénqíng (). The former 
reflects the depth of emotion within a relationship, expressing its tone.60 The latter 
refers to feelings found in friendship, family and kin relationships. Rénqíng includes 
many virtues, like loyalty, justice, honesty or mutuality. These feelings are the source 
of ritual (li), which is also part of the Chinese expression liwu () meaning ‘gift’. 
The gift-giving relations of Guanxi can be understood as "total social phenomena" with 
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their own etiquette and rules. Gift-giving depends on the (social) status of giver and 
receiver.61 Rénqíng “emphasizes the value of maintaining personal harmony and social 
order among persons situated in hierarchically structured relationships”.62 Rénqíng are 
long-term "debts" established by receiving a gift, enduring even generations. The 
notion of reciprocity, obligation and indebtedness is essential for personal relationships, 
but can also have a tactical dimension to it.63  
     Although Guanxi defined like this cannot be said to be utilitarian, it still exposes 
signs of instrumentalism, because generous gift-giving serves as a means to invoke 
reciprocity therefore also certain intentions. The Cultural Revolution is often seen as 
turning point for more manipulative relationships and declining moral standards. Not 
able to decide without influence of the network, people used Guanxi to put social 
pressure on individuals to take away their self-determination. The results of 
relationships are not mere material gains or granted favours, but “the discernment, 
acuity, and cunning needed to get by in life” affected the essence of connections.64 
          During the post-Mao era, particularism and instrumentalism also dominated 
behaviour, using ritualised relationships, especially for doing business. Guanxi is often 
seen as a “shortcut around, or a coping strategy for dealing with, bureaucratic power"65, 
especially in urban areas.66 
     Even today the range of Guanxi relationships in urban areas covers many aspects of 
everyday life, such as housing, facilitating transportation or better education. Beside the 
family also relations to neighbours and other non-kin connections of equivalent status 
are important. Especially the kin-like relations to neighbours have the purpose of 
substituting missing family which might still live in the countryside. Neighbours are 
close in a spatial sense and share the same experiences. Another important part of 
personal urban networks are people known from the military or university, creating 
fictive quasi-kin-relationships.67  
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Apart from the more social aspects of urban life, Guanxi is obviously of importance to 
business relations.68 While mostly ordinary people practised Guanxi during the Cultural 
Revolution, it became an instrument of businessmen afterwards.69 This means that the 
idea of loyalty and trust is carried over as principles of business relations. If people are 
seen as family-like and if they can be trusted because long-term relationships exist, it is 
possible to found enterprises or share resources with them. The networks with non-kin 
based on Gnqíng are the seed from which private entrepreneurship stems.70 Thus, the 
core group, even of larger enterprises, are still often family members or good friends.71 
     The establishment of capitalistic enterprises within a socialist system raises a wide 
range of problems. Many overseas Chinese entrepreneurs utilize social ties to Chinese 
relatives in mainland China who might be able to facilitate and speed up the 
negotiations of investment because it is easier to do business if a Guanxi relation has 
been established. Increasingly, also Western companies under non-Chinese leadership 
engage in Guanxi to facilitate business. During the last year, dozens of studies in 
business journals72 were published “to help business practitioners in China, especially 
those from the Western countries, to gain a deeper and more practical insight into the 
Chinese social network, and to help them make effective cross-cultural adaptation and 
business decisions in the unfamiliar cultural environment of China”.73 
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Also, customers prefer to do business on the basis of already existing relations.74 This 
process does not rely on legal contracts but involves dinner banquets and gifts, for 
example cigarettes or alcohol. In contrast to the often difficult negotiations in joint 
venture investments of Chinese state enterprises and foreign companies, investments 
based on Guanxi are established much faster.75 Gift exchange serves the logic of a 
Capitalism just emerging within a socialist society, which still has gaps in its legal 
system and lacks the institutions which enable it to establish enterprises in a rational, 
exact procedure. Guanxi can thus be regarded as a substitute for formal institutions.76 
Additionally, it reveals a resistance to and a mistrust of formal organizations in 
sidestepping official ways of, for example, obtaining employment. As also courts and 
the enforcement of laws are still viewed as easily to manipulate and therefore corrupt 
and the concept of universal rights and individual jurisdiction are perceived as alien and 
imported from the West, solving problems within ones networks based on mutual 
obligations is considered far more effective.77  
     Those market ‘imperfections’ favour business connections among smaller groups of 
people over more complex organizational structures. This reveals that family 
connections build on trust and Guanxi prove to be essential for doing business in 
China.78 Hence, “social relationships built on gift exchange provide a substitute form of 
trust that can improve the profitability of investment and reduce the risk of arbitrary 
bureaucratic interference that is not in the interests of the investors”.79 It mobilizes 
cultural values such as obligation and reciprocity to pursue “both diffuse social ends 
and calculated instrumental ends", substituting for and complementing of the (not yet) 
existing market mechanisms.80  
     In the studies mentioned above, Guanxi is reduced to a purely instrumental business 
phenomenon: “Guanxi refers to a network of informal interpersonal relationships and 
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exchanges of favours established for the purpose of conducting business activities 
throughout China and East Asia”.81 On the contrary, the art of Guanxi in the form of 
gift exchange is necessarily tied to a pre-existing relationship between giver and 
recipient and differs from bribery. Although Guanxi often touches the edges of 
corruption, it is more subtle than bribery would be. The difference between gift and 
bribe is mostly depending on the manner of giving.82 If in giving gifts the motive of 
getting something in return is getting to obvious, the gift may get interpreted as bribe. 
For corruption, a connection is only established for the purpose of bribing, whereas for 
Guanxi an already existing relationship is mandatory before gifts are exchanged.83  
          The instrumental side of Guanxi has also moral aspects and serves as a social 
function. It therefore not only has a manipulative side of mutual exchange, but entails 
also the notion of emotional feeling for the acquaintance. Thus, if a businessman wants 
it to be clear that he is engaging in Guanxi, the relationship has to be of more 
importance than the instrumental goal connected with the gift. The pre-determined 
etiquette has to be followed, otherwise the exchange will be regarded as bribery. Even 
if an instrumental purpose is the reason for engaging in Guanxi, it has to be apparent 
that people engaging in the negotiations share strong Gãnqíng, which raises the 
exchange to a higher plane.84 Thus, gifts are given in the aforementioned form of 
banquets or other complaisances proving the Gãnqíng element of the connection. 
Bribery would not offer this advantage because no shared identity exists. Guanxi 
prevents to be dependent on corrupt officials and thus minimizes the expenses without 
loss of face. As a result, a private sector based on small enterprises often in the 
ownership of families is created which established its own rules - the art of Guanxi.85  
     In general, Guanxi-Capitalism shares the major principles of global Capitalism, but 
those instruments are used to obtain not only material but equally important also 
symbolic capital.86 Contrary to Western capitalistic thinking, there is a gain of giving 
away. The more generous businessmen prove to be, the more symbolic capital - social 
status and face - he gains. This type of Capitalism is thus not as instrumental-rational as 
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global Capitalism is. Guanxi represents a different framework for a capitalist system 
and thus is in need of specific institutions to function successfully. In contrast to the 
19
th century-type Capitalism which superimposed the existing traditional institutions, 
family structures in particular, to create an environment better suiting for its purpose, 
Guanxi shows that instead of supplanting traditional structures, it needs to revive them.  
 
 
3.2. Views on the Traditional Chinese Family 
 
The Chinese kinship system always played an important role in the Chinese social 
system but has been evaluated very differently over time. In imperial China, the 
individual defined itself through the family, typically living in self-sustaining 
households.87 The Chinese family system traditionally exhibits a high degree of social 
solidarity before the background of parental authority connected with obedience and 
respect of the children. Those values and rules can be derived from Confucian ethic 
which constitutes the most important guideline for Chinese behavioural patterns. No 
well-ordered property rights existed, it was thus rational to rely only on one’s family as 
family ties served as a buffer against social insecurity. The clan filled the institutional 
gap in Chinese social and political structure because it fulfilled duties like acting as 
juridical authority and lending money.88  
     Max Weber described the negative role of those “sib fetters of the economy”.89 In 
his studies on Confucianism and Taoism, he states that the pre-revolutionary family 
structure posed obstacles to rational entrepreneurial development.90 He scrutinizes 
China to see which aspects inhibited the development of rational Capitalism, but most 
likely just wanted to substantiate his thesis of the causal relation of Protestantism and 
Capitalism. Among other aspects, he analyses the strong family loyalties based on 
Confucian values. The Confucian culture of authoritarianism, hierarchy and 
ethnocentrism fosters economic activity in the form of family businesses rather than 
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large corporations.91 Confucianism has a this-worldly orientation and is based on 
traditionalism instead of change and innovation and for Weber is thus impedimental to 
rational bourgeois Capitalism.92 Further obstacles are the requirement of Chinese 
families for strict obedience to parental authority. This and the distribution of resources 
according to the status within the family generated a lack of work discipline due to 
nepotism. Open positions had to be filled with family members and thus labour could 
not be acquired from a free labour market. Through the lack of personal mobility the 
spread of ideas and technology is also nearly non-existing. Additionally, due to the fact 
that sons inherit equal shares of their father’s company by tradition, it never grows over 
a certain size.93  
     Interestingly, Weber argues that Confucian cultures are able to absorb Capitalism 
more easily than other non-western societies. The reason for this he attributes to the 
specific role of family networks and the importance of learning for Confucianism.94 He 
perceives this as essential for an easy incorporation of Capitalism, even though the very 
same culture did not form Capitalism by itself. Institutional factors, such as family and 
networks, are of great significance for the development of a completely different 
system of economy and society.95 Weber justifies that with a "lack of a particular 
mentality" and with a "personalistic principle" being in place in China with traits like 
stolidity or absence of curiosity.96 Additionally, Weber claims that "the Chinese soul 
has never been revolutionized by a prophet"97 which further prevented to set up 
rational, bureaucratic companies and compete with the West.98 Confucianism aimed at 
making rational adjustment to eternally given social structures, which means that it 
took the world as set and thus, given.99 Confucianism also lacked the emotional 
pressure and dynamic of Puritanism that drove the faithful to rebuild the world 
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according to God's wishes. In contrast, Confucianism emphasised orderliness and self-
discipline, thus being “a prudent policy of sound conservatism”.100 “The Confucian 
way of life was rational but was determined, unlike Puritanism, from without rather 
than from within. The contrast can teach us that mere sobriety and thriftiness combined 
with acquisitiveness and regard for wealth were far from representing and far from 
releasing 'the capitalist spirit'”.101Weber comes to the conclusion that “Confucian 
rationalism meant rational adjustment to the world; Puritan rationalism meant rational 
mastery of the world”.102  
          Of course, the institutional preconditions such as separation of household and 
business and rational bureaucracy are also said to be missing in China.103 Weber 
accounts the patrimonial order of the state and the importance of kinship organization 
and thus "the unbroken and continued existence of the cohesive sib and the pre-eminent 
position of its head"104 for the inhibition of a bourgeois Capitalism. The risk-taking and 
innovation essential for such a system to work is not given in a conservative 
environment that values harmony and a static state structure.105 In contrast, 
Protestantism was able to shatter the fetters of the sib.106 
     Weber also considers the Chinese way of doing business only with people they are 
somehow connected to as weakness. The skill to establish Guanxi networks, and more 
importantly, the time and effort required to set up such systems, distract from business 
and promote corruption. For those reasons, family businesses have been replaced by 
professionally run bureaucratic corporations in the West which help Capitalism and the 
Industrial Revolution thrive. Weber predicts the same for China, if Chinese people free 
themselves from family obligations.  
          When the communists assumed control over the country in 1949, they were 
determined to get rid of the familism of the Chinese Society. They also believed that 
the traditional patrilineal Chinese family constituted a thread to modernization and an 
obstacle to Chinese development. They identified the family as an antagonistic 
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corporate body to the influence of ideology and nationalism. For those reasons, the 
Communists tried to weaken and even destroy traditional family structures with 
political actions in order to win back control. As a consequence of the collectivism of 
agriculture and the introduction of communes instead of clans, the peasant household 
was deprived of its economic base. Former family firms were converted to state-owned 
enterprises. The peasants became hired farm workers with only little opportunity for 
economic diversification within the family.107 However, the communists never 
succeeded in fully suppressing the family values because their tenaciousness was not 
taken into account. Against expectations, they prevailed even after the Cultural 
Revolution.  
     During that time, the (Western) modernization theory, similar to Max Weber before 
them, regards the personalistic culture as the cause of China's failure to develop 
Capitalistic structures. It separates societies into 'traditional' or 'modern', assuming they 
are converging in the long-run to a state of industrialization and thus developing into a 
modern, capitalistic economy. The viewpoint of that time is sceptical towards China’s 
chances for industrializing and developing a rational Capitalism.108 The reason is the 
‘accepted wisdom’ that Chinese family firms represent an 'outmoded organization 
form', not able to transform in a way needed for a rational capitalistic economy with 
mass production.  The “family loyalty and obligations t[ake] precedence over other 
loyalties and obligations. Thus, the extended family tends to dilute individual 
incentives to work, save, and invest”.109 This leads to the conclusion that economic 
progress (of the West) would have been impossible without the loss of significance of 
traditional family structures. Considered how import family ties are for China, the 
reason for its underdevelopment seems obvious.110 
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3.3. The Chinese Family and Economic Development after 1978 
 
“…the concept of a contract…is an alien one amongst the small highly 
specialised firms, as contracts incur extra costs, and after all, what 
influence could a contract have between brothers and neighbours?”111 
 
3.3.1. The Transition to Capitalism and the Reviving of Institutions 
 
After 1978, the transformation of the Chinese economic system from a planned to a 
market economy based on competition and the division of labour went surprisingly 
smoothly. It was made possible by the revitalization and creation of institutions to 
expand, regulate, and channel economic transactions, especially in the private sector. 
They were designed to complement the existing institutions. The (re-)newed 
institutions were a response to the organizational problems arising in agriculture, 
industry, and commerce in the course of reforms.112 Hence, the Chinese transformation 
was only possible with the emergence of entrepreneurs and privately-owned 
enterprises. The particular problems found in the Chinese economy after their entrance 
in the global market were most efficiently faced with the re-utilization of Chinese 
family enterprises and personal networks as a means to do business the Chinese way. 
Thus, past institutions were adapted and revived, bridging the gap of social order, left 
by the breakdown of Socialism after the Cultural Revolution. Institutions based on 
traditional values assisted in finding a unique way of business practises, creating a 
specific Chinese Capitalism based on Guanxi.113  
     To sidestep the problem of ownership in a time when private property was still not 
officially sanctioned114, villages were authorized to decide on the ownership of former 
state domains. The local bureaucracy of imperial China was revived to deal with the 
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question of property rights. The village councils gave land use rights to peasant 
families or private entrepreneurs to enable the establishment of small businesses. For 
this, contracts were used, enforced by local arbitral courts, which were already known 
during the Ming Dynasty as ‘harvest splitting contracts’.115 The entrepreneur got a 
fixed wage plus a certain percentage of the profits as incentive. Thus, a collective 
memory enabled the emergence of a private sector in reviving traditional long-known 
institutions. 
     It was assumed that Guanxi would vanish after the Cultural Revolution, when it 
mainly served as a means for survival. Together with modernity also the institutions 
related to a modern rational (Western) capitalistic society would emerge, such as 
contractual certainties, defined property rights, freedom of trade, prices determined on 
a free market or tradable factors of production, thus making Guanxi obsolete. Quite the 
opposite has been the case: instead of merely being a temporary phenomenon, Guanxi 
adapted to the new institutions of the emerging capitalist state, rather than being 
exchanged for rational-legal institutions imposed.116 Guanxi facilitated the reviving of 
the private sector during the economic reforms of 1978 and after. They led to the 
establishment of small, privately-owned enterprises especially in rural areas or 
provinces with few State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). These small firms were mainly 
run by families, which worked according to the principles of the market economy, 
giving time and space to the entrepreneurs to find their own way of doing business in 
those instable and risky circumstances.117 Thus, from the 1990s Guanxi faded away in 
some areas due to the appearance of legal institutions which replaced it, but 
simultaneously found "new territory to colonize".118 The gift-economy still coexisted 
with the new form of commodity economy, having significance for commercial 
transactions, because still money cannot buy everything. Large networks help small 
enterprises to get access to more resources, even in an unstable political and economic 
surrounding, therefore supporting their flexibility and the ability to adapt.119 This is for 
example used to obtain bank loans or supplies from unofficial sources, to make sure 
that in the competitive economy of China a firm can keep up with the market and raise 
their profits. It helps to save money and to facilitate economic transactions, especially 
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for supplies, in bypassing state institutions for e.g. getting a passport, finding job 
opportunities or linking up with relatives overseas.120  
          In some regions of China the connection between Guanxi and economic 
development is especially obvious. In Wenzhou, for example, located in Zhejiang 
province, almost at the centre of China’s eastern coast, privatization started very early 
and relied heavily on small family firms working in clusters to produce products 
manufactured in small-scale production using simple labour-intensive technology. 
Wenzhou’s private sector generates 90 percent of GDP of its province.121 Thus, “the 
family became the entrepreneurial core for the development of a plethora of 
enterprises…coalescing into vast business networks”.122 Wenzhou is therefore often 
called the “quintessential capital of China’s network Capitalism”.123 It also is said to 
have China’s largest underground informal banking network.  
 
“Wenzhou's webs of private lending are held together by a gentleman's code. 
Borrowers are introduced and implicitly guaranteed by friends and relatives. 
Huang Weijin […] explains why local business people would rather lose 
their lives than default on a private loan. "I can fly to Europe or Africa with 
only 300 yuan because other Wenzhou businessmen will look after me. They 
drive to Germany from Italy to pick me up, and I would do the same. It 
doesn't matter if you lose money. But if you lose trust, you lose everything." 
Those bonds of business kinship, extending across China and the global 
Wenzhou diaspora, are far stronger than the contracts that bind borrowers to 
faceless state-owned banks. "It's more secure than a state-controlled bank 
because if someone doesn't repay they have no place to play in Wenzhou any 
more," says Zhou Dewen, who heads the Wenzhou Small and Medium 
Enterprise Development Association.”124 
 
Enterprises in Wenzhou work in a nexus of dense social networks, centered on family 
firms and historically rooted trust and culture. Even today it is shaped by the traditional 
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labor-intensive industries with their low level of processing and low added value as it 
has been from its beginnings in the 1970s.125 This obviously contradicts Weber’s 
prediction that industrialization and thus rationalization will supplant traditional feudal 
institutions to be successful. 
     Hence, the success of Wenzhou – standing here for many similar cases within China 
-strongly hinges on its structure of family-owned businesses connected through 
personal networks. Its economy is reconstituted of “local kinship relations and 
structures, in contrast to most understandings of Capitalism as the destruction of 
kinship by the mobility and fragmentation of wage labor”.126 
 
 
3.3.2. Chinese Family Businesses after the Cultural Revolution 
 
When China slowly opened up after the economic reforms of 1978, the family proved 
to be the foundation from which the success of the Chinese economy can be 
explained.127 The collective times seemed to have built-up urge for more autonomy 
which then erupted in massive entrepreneurial endeavours, especially in rural areas. 
Entrepreneurial instincts were preserved and could flourish with the institutions 
provided by economic reforms.128 
     The Chinese family was changed but remained the most important social institution, 
even after several decades of Communism. The rural family reconstituted, still serving 
as shelter against social insecurities, now in times of globalization and Capitalism. On 
the contrary, all the political and social commotion only fortified the trust in the family 
as the only institution that is able to provide stability. The Chinese family proved to be 
a remarkably adaptive social organism, able to respond to a complex set of 
circumstances.  
          Max Weber’s assessment was reversed, mainly due to a changed institutional 
environment which prior to 1949 supported the more impedimental features. The pre-
revolutionary institutions changed to support the features that foster economic success 
in a competitive capitalistic environment. Global capitalism with its features of flexible, 
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transnational production favoured small business production over larger corporations 
and thus, subcontracting.129 Now “Chinese familism will fuel the motor of 
development”.130 Within family businesses, the problem of unqualified successors is 
often solved in sending sons to good universities, preferably in the US or Europe or to 
marry off one's daughter to a suitable son-in-law. Thus, nepotism still exists and 
families play a big role, but in the circumstances of today's economy it became not an 
obstacle but an advantage, not to be institutionalised and hence not be able to grow as 
company over a certain size.131  
          Family ties are evaluated as creating strong loyalties which lead to economic 
success and motivation of the single family member. Mutual trust and obligation are 
essential elements of familiarity and thus also prerequisites for Guanxi.132 Young 
Chinese study hard for the sake of the family. Not only do they seek to get a good 
education, but once they start working they also work hard for less money than non-
family members. Even if more money is offered elsewhere, they tend to stay in the 
family business, thus providing continuity. Using family members for manager 
positions within the firm also provides the advantage of creating a ‘natural authority’. 
On the other hand, family firms are not required to give positions to all family 
members. Relatives and even sons who do not show sufficient talent are driven out of 
the family business.  
          When a firm is passed to the next generation, the sons are entrusted with a 
subsidiary unit, for which they have the sole responsibility, including the reinvestment 
of profits. This is seen as possibility to diversify the decision-making when a firm 
prospers and grows. At the same time, there is no loss of profit to outsiders because 
there is no need to employ external managers.133 This “package of individual incentives 
and group insurance against failure […] encourages the emergence of highly motivated, 
risk-taking entrepreneurs.”134 The firm is divided in equal parts between sons - thus 
preventing a company to grow over a certain size, which is now seen as advantage. 
Small firms require only small start-up costs and adjust more flexible to changed 
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market situations. This situation also produces a highly competitive market 
environment – if one firm collapses, new ones fill the gap quickly. This mode of 
production is particularly efficient in labour-intensive, quickly-changing and segmented 
markets such as those for textiles or the toys industries. Chinese family firms are 
successful because smaller firms have the advantage to react flexible to the 
requirements of the market and are able to decide quickly.135They operate less 
successfully in capital-intensive sectors where, due to complex production processes, 
profits can only be made when a certain volume of production is reached.136  
     Chinese firm use Guanxi for doing business, which increasingly takes place in less 
formal places like restaurants, at home or in nightclubs.137 As gifts or banquets are not 
longer sufficient, “a long night sharing the pleasures of masculine heterosexuality and 
giving women's bodies and sexual services as gifts will cement Guanxi better".138 Thus, 
strengthening Guanxi through masculine bonding emphasises its practise as a more 
male instrument. Guanxi today "traps women and the poor while benefiting fraternal 
business associations".139 
     One part of Guanxi is thus the recreation of traditional rigid forms of division of 
labour by gender and generation to achieve economic success. Also, “despite the hectic 
pace of economic development, […], obligations to parents and the larger family seem 
robustly intact”.140 Guanxi-Capitalism is often viewed as more "humane and thus more 
efficient than the alienating contractual and individualistic Capitalism of the West".141 
This overlooks the widespread violence with its consequence of inequality, especially 
for women. Although a notion of mutual support exists, Guanxi also has the aim to give 
more flexibility to few to arrange business structures at the cost of many, particularly in 
small-scale family enterprises, where the factor of cheap labour of kinship is often 
exploited. They rely on unpaid or low paid family labour, with “females filling in when 
and where needed”142, slipping ‘effortlessly’ into their traditional roles. Their work is 
regarded as part of their household and family duties, not as careers. Guanxi-Capitalism 
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thus changes the principles and logic of the individualistic form of Capitalism but also 
facilitates the adaptation of exploitative Capitalism as Chinese family firms are based 
on paternal authority, not individual rights.143 The recourse to Confucian values and 
Guanxi is used to reinvent old forms of family life which is dominated by men.144  
          Guanxi thus exchanges institutionalised dominance with personalized power of 
people. The need to constantly cultivate and maintain connections therefore seems to fit 
to an environment where power-relations are not (yet) stable. Often, personal networks 
survive, even if family firms change their business or seize to exist. In those 
circumstances it is still rational to use Guanxi, although it may be time-consuming and 
costly. Yet, this does not necessarily imply that once rational-legal institutions are 
established, Guanxi as more irrational mode of economic activity will fade away. 
Rather, it may coexist in a newly defined institutional and cultural style of modernity.  
    Economic development was fostered by Guanxi because it favours small flexible 
firms. These enterprises gain access to markets and supplies with the help of personal 
relationships. They only have subcontracts with larger companies and thus are able to 
change products and the mode of production very quickly. The actualities of global 
Capitalism force these businessmen to use the comparative advantages at hand – the 
smallness of their enterprises and their family. In combination with the existence of 
large personal networks, once established to meet the necessities of daily life in 
Socialist China, and small start-up costs gave them the necessary flexibility to get an 
entry ticket to the world market of commodities. This contrasts to the huge 
multinational enterprises with strict hierarchies and a lot fixed investment capital, 
giving the small family firms of China a competitive advantage in the world market.145 
          To conclude, the advantage of small family firms in business is their ability to 
produce at very low costs and to react very flexible to changes in the economy. 
Especially their possibility to produce with a minimum of labour costs gives them a 
comparative advantage. This is not only a reaction to a relaxation of the Chinese 
economic environment, but is also due to changes in the world economy that supported 
flexible units of productions. Thus, depending on the external institutional setting, the 
Chinese family is indeed able to fulfil the requirements of modern economic activity 
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with its own type of Capitalism. Under the given circumstances it not only can fuel 
growth, but is also an important prerequisite for it.146  
 
 
4. Conclusion: Evidence for a Chinese Capitalism  
 
“The difference between Chinese and westerners is not that one is 
relational and the other rational. Both are rational and relational. The 
difference is that western rationality is more based on universalistic 
principles and individual rights (jurisdiction) the Chinese rationality is 
based on particularistic principles and obligations and patron-clientelism 
(the opposite of clearly defined individual rights).147 
 
In this paper I provided evidence that in contrast to Weber’s view, various forms of 
Capitalism can exist and that family structures play an important role in forming a 
certain type of capitalistic system. This was proved with the description of a specific 
Chinese Capitalism and an analysis of the important role of family structures for it.  
     Modern Capitalism is, following Weber, defined as a function of a certain spirit 
based on rationality, in need of a specific institutional framework to be successful. It is 
presented as an attitude consisting of a systematic combination of characteristics. In 
addition, Capitalism is regarded as an age of separation, by which not merely 
separating the pre-modern traditional economy from the modern, capitalistic one is 
meant, but also the separations in people's cultural environment, the family in 
particular. 
     In contrast to the view that Capitalism takes on the same form globally, wherever 
and whenever it arises, destroying the traditional structures of societies and unifying the 
cultural diversity required for its success, specific cultural idiosyncrasies seem to exist 
which are able to produce a harmonious symbiosis with capitalistic structures, mutually 
assisting and enhancing the given opportunities. Hence, Guanxi-Capitalism revives 
traditional institutions, making China a competitive force in the global market. Instead 
of regarding family businesses as outdated mode of production, the Chinese economic 
success relies on the flexibility and personal networks of privately-owned family firms. 
Guanxi is not only a multifaceted and crucial concept for firms to survive on the world 
                                                 
146 Whyte, Martin King (1996): ibid., p. 19ff. and Whyte, Martin King (1995), ibid., p. 1017f. 
147 Peng, Yusheng (2003): Kinship Networks, Village Industry, and Max Weber. The Chinese University 
of Hong Kong, Department of Sociology, p. 3. 37 
 
market, but is also embedded in most functions of everyday life, being based on mutual 
trust of long-term relations. As one's closest network it is logical - and rational! - to 
place one's own family also in the centre of business relations. Thus, the rationality of 
Guanxi-Capitalism is based on the unique framework of China’s culture and history.  
     In imperial China, the family and traditional structures of society did not support the 
emergence of a Western-type Capitalism guided by a certain spirit. More than a century 
later, after this Capitalism had taken over most of the world's countries and shaped a 
certain global economy dependent on flexible production, exactly those structures 
proved to be fertile soil for economic development. With globalization, markets and the 
production system changed, beside gigantic multi-national corporations also small 
family-based firms are found, acting extremely successfully in this environment of 
subcontracting, rapid changes in demands and product niches. The Chinese private 
sector, based on small family businesses, fits perfectly in this changed institutional 
framework. The economic environment of the late 20
th and early 21
st century gave 
space to another form of capitalistic system which with the family and networks 
revived social techniques and institutions known from the past that now play a major 
role for Chinese economic development. Additionally, the emergence of niche markets 
and the need of flexible specialisation favoured the mostly small-sized Chinese family 
enterprises. Having no formalized bureaucratic system and capable of connecting over 
Guanxi networks, these firms are both highly flexible and extremely successful low-
cost producers. Guanxi provides access to far more resources than small family 
businesses would have without networks and also the necessary reliability for doing 
business. Multinational corporations increasingly subcontracted to those small and 
medium enterprises, therefore Chinese firms gained market shares for low-end, labour-
intensive products, trading across borders with the help of networks.148  
     Thus, China did not just copy the Western form of Capitalism but has found its own 
way of coping with the demands of the world market. Institutions from the past were 
remodelled to adapt to the conditions of the modern global economy as efficiently as 
possible, instrumentalizing cultural and social institutions.149 It has to be emphasized 
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that this family-based system strongly depends on the exploitation of cheap labour, 
especially of women. Although very successful economically, Guanxi-type Capitalism 
is above all a male dominated, patriarchal structure. 
     It is often argued that once a complete legal institutional framework is established, 
Guanxi will lose its importance and the economic system will turn into a uniform, 
global Capitalism. The establishment of a civil society, in combination with people 
trusting the newly created institutions, will supersede Guanxi. Additionally, because 
Chinese family firms operate most efficiently in labour-intensive low- and medium-
technology industries that produce mainly for export, their success might merely be 
temporary. If unable to provide the necessary capital and sufficiently highly skilled 
workers needed to develop capital-intensive high-technology industries might cause the 
family to become an obstacle again.150 Indeed, family enterprises will certainly not play 
an important role in every sector of the economy. Even within the private sector family 
firms will concentrate on branches where they can outplay their comparative advantage 
of fast reactions to changes in demand and thus complement the more Western style 
institutions of other sectors. 
     However, the interaction between family structures and economic change has no 
unilateral causality, rather they mutually influence each other. Economic development 
changes the nature of the family, but so too does the structure of the family influence 
the modalities of industrialization.151 It is important to note that “indigenous economies 
are not always plowed under with the introduction of Capitalism but may even 
experience renewal and pose a challenge to capitalist principles, stimulating us to 
rethink existing critiques of capitalism”.152 Capitalism thus can be modified, which 
means that market forces do not necessarily overrun the existing traditional features. A 
capitalistic economy can function under a different organizational and institutional 
structure, particularly depending on the existing family structure.153 Capitalism is 
therefore not a unifying concept, but rather a divisive one due to institutional 
characteristics.154 
     Family structures have proved to wield a strong influence on Capitalism. They do 
not merely react to the changes within society, with traditional forms forced to 
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subordinate to market forces, but complement Capitalism to meet economic demands. 
Guanxi proved to be a powerful tool in its ability to adapt. Despite all assumptions of 
mainstream economics, the Chinese economy is extremely successful and its economic 
system works quite efficiently, even though Western-style institutions do not (yet) exist 
or are not put to use. In contrast, personal relations expose comparative efficiency as 
they are chosen as the most capable instrument for the private sector in China, with the 
result that “the growth of export production has taken place outside of the state sector 
of industry, within foreign funded, rural and township, and privately owned 
enterprises”.155 
     My view is that we are witnessing the establishment of a new form of economic 
system, based on different principles such as Guanxi and the family. To Chinese 
“human life is a complex web of relations with the world, relations with the mind and 
relations to others”.156 Those features are immanent to Chinese culture and will not 
become extinct. The common view that Capitalism necessarily has to impoverish large 
fractions of the population and destroy traditional institutions to prosper may yet be 
proven wrong. The structure of the Chinese family proved to be very persistent over 
time and to be able to accommodate diverse economic and political environments while 
maintaining its core identity. This implies that Chinese Capitalism may in fact be more 
sustainable than is often assumed. The 'iron cage' - a striking symbol of the destructive 
forces of Capitalism in Weber's writings - might today still exist but without the 
implications that it had for Western societies. Instead of being destroyed, the Chinese 
family-based economy adapted to a capitalistic environment.  
     Whether or not family structures are indeed permanently strong enough to withstand 
economic pressure and escape the 'iron cage' will in the case of China be shown when 
corporations grow and the demand for capital increases. The failure or success of 
family structures to adapt again to changing circumstances would then demonstrate the 
superior (overwhelming) power of Capitalism over socio-cultural structures - or the 
reverse. However, this paper provided sufficient arguments that a Chinese form of 
rational Capitalism exists, which can prosper without necessarily destroying long-
existing culturally and historically embedded institutions. 
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